I did once work up an idea for radical patent reform. A fun project. This is from memory and may be wrong in details.
A patent application includes several things:
* A complete description of how to make the product.
* A deadline for reproduction; the patent is valid at least this long.
* The royalty schedule.
If no one can reproduce the product by the deadline, there is no patent. If someone does make a copy, the time it took is multiplied by some factor to set the patent duration.
So the patent holder's incentive is to specify the recipe so well that it can be reproduced by the deadline, otherwise there will be no patent and no royalties. At the same time, the product must be advanced enough that it can't be reproduced so quickly that the patent expires too soon to collect any significant royalties. And furthermore, if it is too simple, copycats might just keep their reproduction private and wait for the deadline to ex[ire the patent, then jump into production without royalties.
The copycats have two choices: rush to be first to reproduce the product, both for market share and to keep the patent as short as possible; or reproduce the product but keep it private so the patent expires unless some other copycat shows up, in which case the first copycat can enter the market right on their heels.
The parameters make a difference.
* If the maximum deadline is too long, it will discourage copycats.
* If the time-to-reproduction multiplication factor is too short; it will reduce royalties and (allegedly!) discourage innovation. If the factor is too big, it will discourage copycats.