Foogle raises good points. However, I don't think it can reasonably be argued that you are actually at any point transferring consciousness with this process so much as copying it. Though more sophisticated it is not entirely unlike the issues that revolve around cloning or twins. From the moment of the split even if you start out with all things being equal (and even if you ignore the fact that one of these consciousnesses is in a machine!) you effectively have two distinct consciousness immediately due to environmental difference that will probably grow more divergent over time if they are exposed to radically different environments. I think the fundamental issue that is not addressed by this article is that simply copying all of the "hardware" that we can currently understand and perceive may not be enough to capture consciousness. On some level it is saying that if we were able to freeze a ball in motion, completely slice it, and then reproduce it we would have the same thing--I believe velocity would be lost. (This is an anology, and it is even more relevant if you consider our subatomic particle understanding even a mere 20 years ago.) I don't think that the dynamic complexity of information that makes up consciousness will be captured simply by grabbing neurotransmitter concentrations at the synapse any more than rebuilding a computer from scratch would show you what screensaver it was playing. Interesting thought experiment though.