Comment Re:10K logical qubits? (Score 1) 32
So a million physical qubits means 10K or so logical qubits usable (as IBM has mentioned needing around 100 physical qubits for each error corrected logical qubit). If IBM can build a million physical qubit system by 2030, larger ones will no doubt follow. Moving to PQC and deprecating (in 2030) and disallowing (in 2035) RSA 2048 is probably the right recommendations by NIST.
No one should be using RSA now, even ignoring QC. RSA is slow, unwieldy and error-prone. No one who knows what they're doing uses it except in very narrow niches where it has properties that EC doesn't. Every cryptographer and cryptographic security engineer I know (including me) treats the use of RSA in protocol designs as analogous to a "code smell", a strong one. If I see a protocol design that uses RSA, it's an immediate red flag that the designer very likely doesn't know what they're doing and has probably made a bunch of mistakes that compromise security. Unless, of course, the design explains in detail why they did the weird and risky thing. Competent people will know it's weird and risky and explain their rationale for using RSA in the first few paragraphs of the doc.
However, the EC-based things people should be using are also at risk to QCs, and everyone making hardware with a lifespan of more than a few years should be moving to PQC algorithms now. At minimum, you should make sure that your cryptography-dependent designs explicitly plan for how you will migrate to PQC (including on devices in the field, if relevant). You don't have to actually move now as long as you have a clear path for moving later. But if you're, say, shipping hardware with embedded firmware verification keys, you should probably make sure that it contains a SPHINCS+ key or something and some way to enable its use in the future, even if only to bootstrap the use of some more manageable PQC algorithm.