The DNS system by nature has a single root, the trust chain doesn't necessarily have that.
The SPKI guys back in the 90s figured this stuff out really, really well. Ideally, one would have: a DNS trust chain indicating that b24e:6f99:2f6f:34d8:9c8a:c6da:daaf:e3bb:002e:2ba4:2622:4cf9:cd8b:14a5:71d8:5a9c:18dc:47a2:9a2d:2951:a26b:26fa:2165:85fc:7006:0d66:1c8e:a4f4:ea36:4d04:57a0:8ae4 speaks on behalf of owns example.net; an IP trust chain indicating that b24e:6f99:2f6f:34d8:9c8a:c6da:daaf:e3bb:002e:2ba4:2622:4cf9:cd8b:14a5:71d8:5a9c:18dc:47a2:9a2d:2951:a26b:26fa:2165:85fc:7006:0d66:1c8e:a4f4:ea36:4d04:57a0:8ae4 speaks on behalf of the owner of 192.0.2.7, and possibly certifications from other organisations (Better Business Bureau perhaps) that b24e:6f99:2f6f:34d8:9c8a:c6da:daaf:e3bb:002e:2ba4:2622:4cf9:cd8b:14a5:71d8:5a9c:18dc:47a2:9a2d:2951:a26b:26fa:2165:85fc:7006:0d66:1c8e:a4f4:ea36:4d04:57a0:8ae4 speaks on behalf of a decent dude; users' browsers might demand the first two and show more confidence for further certifications.
SPKI's contributions included a k-of-n standard and, more importantly, transitive authorisations. So once I am granted authorisations from .com to use example.com, I can pass that authorisation on to any machines under my control; I can delegate mail.example.com to my mail-handling group without also giving them financials.example.com. I can do the same thing with my IP address space, my bank account information &c. I could add third-party attestations to my identity, perhaps third parties more resistant to rubber-hose persuasion than the standard ones. Pinning might rely on my personal closely-held private key, which is never online at all but which delegates to online (time-limited and/or revocable) keys. Calculating this stuff is very, very simple and fast. There's no need for any fees along the way. It's easy to reason about.
You can see how this might work with internet governance: each organisation would be responsible for the namespace it was assigned, and be easily able to segment that namespace however it wished. Anyone at any level could cross-certify; damage to the trust chains could be contained.
SPKI is, in every way save uptake, superior to XPKI.